http://www.bushfirecrc.com/sites/defaul ... _sizel.pdfSome very interesting analysis of the 2012/13 fire events, with obviously the Giblin fire being particularly relevant in both circumstance & terrain.
A couple of key take home paragraphs:
"The Giblin River fire was started by lightning early-afternoon on 03/01/13. During this storm, it is probable that about 0.6 mm of rain fell over the fireground. The fire was first reported mid-afternoon on 03/01/13 and at about 15:00 was reported to be 1 to 2 ha in size and burning slowly.12 No attempts were made to suppress the fire at this time owing to the fire’s remoteness, the difficulty of performing effective suppression, the lack of fire suppression resources due to other fires and the very low probability of fire suppression operations being effective." (Pg 30)
"During the major fire run of the Giblin River fire on 04–05/01/13, the Soil Dryness Index (SDI) at the fireground was about 12. The relationships published in Marsden- Smedley et al. (1999) predict that at this level of SDI, only buttongrass moorland and wet scrub should be dry enough to carry fire. Post-fire assessment indicates that only very limited areas of eucalypt forest and no rainforest were burnt (Figure 41)." (Pg 49) (Auspiciously the 04/01 was the major fire run day, to date for the Gell fire)
"The southeast movement of the Giblin River fire was checked by a recent planned burn (Gunfight Creek planned burn performed April 2011) on its southern boundary and wet forest and rainforest on its southeast boundary. The fire then continued to burn up the Spring and Crossing River valleys towards the northeast, mostly as a flank fire." (Pg 32) (With milder current conditions, likely the Gell fire is behaving more as a flank fire, with lower intensity at present, although obviously with unfavourable conditions, can rapidly develop into faster moving, high energy head fire)
"The critical findings from this assessment of fire-suppression resource requirements relate to the importance of:
• early response with adequate resource levels,
• effective mop-up and patrol, and
• the identification of the conditions where suppression is not going to be
effective.
This assessment indicates that where there are adequate resources available to suppress fires (e.g. as occurred during the Butlers Hill, Freshwater Lagoon and Gretna fires), effective suppression can be performed, even under adverse conditions. It also underlines the importance of effective mop-up and patrol following fire knockdown.
Another major finding is that under extreme fire conditions (i.e. high to very high levels of fire danger and extreme levels of C-Haines), effective suppression of running fires will frequently not be feasible, and fire management agencies need to be prepared to pull back and put all available resources into protecting life and property." (Pg 58)
Obviously, this event is significant & affecting areas of very high natural value, which many of us hold dear, but rational scientific consideration & context has to be given to both fire behaviour & history within the Southwest, Wild Rivers & adjoining areas.
Basically, all is not lost.